Classical and Reformed Epistemology Apologetics: Excerpts and Comments

Chapter 1 – Classical Apologetics – William Lane Graig

What we’re going to do is to quote paragraphs showing the position of the apologist and make brief comments on things we either disagree or in need of further elaboration. In statements that we agree, we will just quote and skip them.

And then after presenting the position of each school, we will hear the response from two other schools.

“As often happens in the lives of earnest students, the reading of certain books proved pivotal in my thinking and directed my life along a different route. The first was E. J. Carnell’s Introduction to Christian Apologetics, which convinced me that reason might be used to show the systematic consistency of Christian faith without thereby becoming the basis of that faith. The second was Stuart Hackett’s Resurrection of Theism, which stunned me by its demonstration that there were, after all, persuasive, cogent arguments for God’s existence. Hackett’s book was part of an incomplete project, however, and left one with a sort of deism rather than Christian theism. But then, third, I became acquainted on a popular level with Christian evidences, particularly for the resurrection of Jesus, compiled, for example, by Josh McDowell in Evidence That Demands a Verdict. It became quite evident to me that it was possible to present a sound, convincing, positive case for the truth of Christian theism” (p. 21).

Comment:

Distinction between the instrumentality and the authority of reason.

“. . . in 1977 when I was invited by Campus für Christus to deliver a series of lectures on apologetics to university students in Munich. My opening lecture was to be on faith and reason, and in meditating on this problem, I hit upon a scheme that has proved to be very helpful to me personally in illuminating the relationship between faith and reason—namely, the distinction between knowing Christianity to be true and showing Christianity to be true. It has been gratifying to me that what I grasped in a rough and superficial way has been confirmed by the recent work of religious epistemologists, notably Alvin Plantinga” (p. 22).

Comment:

Summing up Van Til’s twofold consciousness of man and Bavinck’s correlation between faith and reason, I would like to focus on four things about faith and reason. First, reason is not contrary to faith. Second, reason cannot be the standard of faith. Third, faith is not superior to reason. Fourth, there is such a thing as believing reason, a reason restored and empowered by faith.

“The methodological approach which I shall defend in this essay is that reason in the form of rational arguments and evidence plays an essential role in our showing Christianity to be true, whereas reason in this form plays a contingent and secondary role in our personally knowing Christianity to be true. The proper ground of our knowing Christianity to be true is the inner work of the Holy Spirit in our individual selves; and in our showing Christianity to be true, it is his role to open the hearts of unbelievers to assent and respond to the reasons we present” (ibid.).

Comment:

Distinction between the essential and the secondary role of reason.

“This approach is comprised of natural theology and Christian evidences” (bid.).

Comment:

Natural theology?

KNOWING CHRISTIANITY TO BE TRUE

“In this section I shall address the question, How does a Christian believer know that Christianity is true? In answering this question, I distinguish between the role of the Holy Spirit and the role of rational argument and evidence. I shall argue that the inner witness of the Holy Spirit gives us an immediate and veridical assurance of the truth of our Christian faith and that rational argument and evidence may properly confirm but not defeat that assurance” (p. 23).

Role of the Holy Spirit

“Since all five authors do accept Scripture as the rule of faith, it is entirely appropriate to lay out what Scripture teaches on religious epistemology” (ibid.).

“Paul does not hesitate to use the term pterophoria (“complete confidence, full assurance”) to indicate the surety that the believer possesses as a result of the Spirit’s work (Col. 2:2; 1 Thess. 1:5; cf. Rom. 4:21; 14:5)” (p. 24).

Role of Argument and Evidence

“What role, then, is left for rational argument and evidence to play in knowing the Christian faith to be true? On the basis of what has been said, it is evident that the only role left for these is a subsidiary role” (p. 27).

SHOWING CHRISTIANITY TO BE TRUE

The Role of Argument and Evidence

“Turning first to the role of rational argument and evidence in showing Christianity to be true, we confront the difficult and controverted question of the relationship between general revelation and natural theology, a question that in the end may be biblically irresolvable. One school of thought interprets passages like Romans 1:19-20 to sanction natural theology by teaching that from the created order all persons are responsible for inferring the existence of the divine Creator. But an opposing school of thought regards the created order as the context that serves to ground belief in the Creator as properly basic. I think it is clear that the arguments of natural theology are not identical with general revelation; general revelation is the traits of the author reflected in his product, the fingerprints of the potter in the clay, so to speak, whereas the arguments of natural theology are the human products of men’s rational reflection upon general revelation. That fact does not, however, settle the question whether the created order serves as the basis for inferring the Creator’s existence or constitutes the circumstances in which belief in a Creator is properly basic” (p. 29).

 “The defender of natural theology could plausibly maintain that the inference from creation to Creator is so evident at any level of inquiry, from the observations of the primitive savage to the investigations of the scientist, that the non-theist is inexcusable in failing to draw this inference” (ibid.).

Comment:

Relationship between general revelation and natural theology is irresolvable?

This position seems to not seriously taking the noetic effect of the fall. (Note: In philosophy, noetics is a branch of metaphysics concerned with the study of mind as well as intellect.).

The Role of the Holy Spirit

“Finally, what about the role of the Holy Spirit in our showing Christianity to be true? As Pannenberg has emphasized, the work of the Spirit is not to supply the deficits in weak or unsound arguments. Rather, his role is existential: he preveniently moves in the hearts of unbelievers to dissolve their sinful prejudices and open their minds to an honest consideration of the arguments and evidence. In the absence of the work of the Holy Spirit, our best arguments will fall like water on a stone, for the natural man suppresses the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. 1:21)” (p. 35).

Comments:

Prevenience – work of grace prior to repentance or conversion. Is this work of grace salvific? Or is it similar to common grace?

Conclusion

“In conclusion, we have seen that a proper understanding of apologetic methodology involves making a fundamental distinction between our knowing and our showing Christian theism to be true. We know that our Christian beliefs are true because they are properly basic, warranted beliefs grounded in our veridical experience of the witness of the Holy Spirit in our hearts. Rational argument and evidence may confirm our Christian beliefs to us but cannot defeat them if we are walking in the fullness of the Spirit. We can show that Christian theism is true by presenting arguments for theism and evidences for a specifically Christian theism, which go to show, when coupled with defensive apologetics, that Christian theism is the most plausible worldview a sufficiently informed, normal adult can adopt. The Holy Spirit will then use such arguments and evidence to draw unbelievers to a knowledge of God by removing their sinful resistance to the conclusion of our arguments” (p. 36).

Comments:

Rational arguments and evidence as confirmation.

Christian theism as most plausible worldview?

A Presuppositionalist’s Response by John M. Frame

“William Craig tries hard in his epistemology to achieve a balance between the testimony of the Holy Spirit and the role of reason and evidences. In my view, however, an important element of biblical epistemology is almost entirely missing from his account. That is the role of the Word of God” (p. 49).

THE SPIRIT AND THE WORD

“And certainly he understands that Scripture is the definitive formulation of Christian truth. He uses Scripture to establish his view of the Spirit’s testimony as well as his view of evidence and arguments. And his evidences for the resurrection of Jesus are mostly taken from the Bible. But unless I have missed it, he assigns no distinct role to Scripture in his religious epistemology. I am not saying that Craig denies the authority of Scripture; certainly he holds a strong view of it. Rather, I am observing that there is nothing in Craig’s essay about the role of Scripture as the believer’s presupposition, the believer’s ultimate standard of truth and falsity, of right and wrong” (p. 50).

SUBJECT, OBJECT AND NORM

“Craig’s understanding of the knowledge of God is a balance between two factors: evidential arguments and the Spirit’s testimony. These may be described as objective and subjective respectively. For Craig, the latter is primary in ‘knowing’ God, the former in ‘showing’ the truth to a non-Christian. But how do we decide, in either case, what arguments are worth believing? How do we judge between rival conceptions of rationality, fact, truth, and knowledge? By more evidence? But how do we rationally evaluate that additional evidence without falling into an infinite regress? And how do we distinguish between true and false subjective impressions?” (p. 51).

“It seems to me that we need a third element, in addition to the objective and the subjective, that we might call the normative. The normative sets the rules for thinking and knowing, for the use of evidence and reason, for discerning the spirits. It includes such things as the law of non-contradiction and the other basic laws of thought. For Christians the ultimate norm is God’s Word in Scripture” (Ibid.).

INFERENCE AND PROPER BASICALITY

“Craig (with the Reformed epistemologists) makes too much of the question whether Romans 1 justifies natural theology or merely ‘constitutes the circumstances in which belief in a Creator is properly basic’ (p. 39). I think rather that the distinction between believing something as properly basic and believing it on the basis of argument (as in natural theology) is somewhat fluid” (p. 54).

CONCLUSION

“So my main complaints against Craig can be summarized by saying that in my view he has not reflected sufficiently on the nature and importance of norms in human knowledge, especially in Christian thinking, both knowing and showing. Above all, his approach needs to be informed by an epistemology that understands the centrality of God’s Word to all human reasoning” (p. 57).

A Reformed Epistemologists Response by Kelly James Clark

“There is very little in Craig’s essay that I or any other Reformed epistemologist could disagree with, and that makes me a little disappointed, because philosophers thrive on disagreement—if no blood is spilled, we haven’t really had a good debate. I’m also disappointed because there is a view out there, held by some Christian thinkers, that goes by the title “classical apologetics” but is quite different from the position held by Craig” (p. 58).

“The distinction between knowing and showing seems both to fit human experience and to offer a genuine insight into human cognition” (p. 59).

“We theists must admit that we, like everyone else, are certainty seekers and that we, like everyone else, are willing to accept less than compelling evidence for our favored conclusions and to ignore evidence unfavorable to our beliefs. We want to show others but are unwilling to listen to their showings. Our apologetic projects are often little more than proclamation but should, given our cognitive limitations, involve listening. We need to listen to others for two reasons: (1) we might be wrong and (2) we need to know where we share common intellectual ground on which to base our showings. Our success as apologists depends on our willingness to recognize our own shortcomings and also our willingness to listen to the other and to begin with our shared beliefs and commitments” (p. 63).

“What I oppose is the magisterial use of reason when it comes to nonbelievers. We often wield reason as a hammer to pound others, failing to recognize our own human cognitive limitations. While reason is a tool, it is a more modest tool; it may be a guide to the truth, but it is not an infallible guide” (p. 64).

Chapter 5 – Reformed Epistemology Apologetics by Kelly James Clark

Comment:

Reaching the fifth chapter, I now see this book as a kind of survey of all the five apologetics methods with the intention to promote the Reformed Epistemology Apologetics. Now that I reached the fifth chapter, I intend to give this position a careful reading as part of my preparation for my Apologetics class this second semester of AY 2020-2021 @ PTS CAS.

“Since the Enlightenment, there has been a demand to expose all of our beliefs to the searching criticism of reason. If a belief is unsupported by the evidence, it is irrational to believe it. It is the position of Reformed epistemology (likely the position that Calvin held) that belief in God, like belief in other persons, does not require the support of evidence or argument in order for it to be rational. This view has been defended by some of the world’s most prominent philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga, leader of the recent revival in Christian philosophy. Plantinga was Reformed epistemology’s first contemporary defender, and his home institution, Calvin College, supported the research of other prominent philosophers in its development, including Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and George Mavrodes” (p. 190).

“The renaissance of Christian philosophy owes a great debt to the intellectual power and fertility of Reformed epistemology. The claim that belief in God is rational without the support of evidence or argument is startling for many an atheist or theist. Most atheist intellectuals feel comfort in their disbelief in God because they judge that there is little or no evidence for God’s existence. Many theistic thinkers, however, in particular Roman Catholics and some recent Protestant evangelicals, insist that belief in God requires evidence and that such a demand should and can be met. So the claim that a person does not need evidence in order to rationally believe in God runs against the grain for atheist thinkers and has raised the ire of many theists” (ibid.).

Comment:

Reformed epistemology is in the frontline of current philosophical debate.

THE DEMAND FOR EVIDENCE

“There is a limit to the things that human beings can prove. A great deal of what we believe is based on faith, not on evidence or arguments. I use the term ‘faith’ here, but I think it is misleading. I don’t mean to oppose faith to knowledge in these instances. . . In these cases, we know lots of things, but we cannot prove them” (p. 192).

WITHOUT EVIDENCE OF ARGUMENT

“There are at least three reasons to believe that it is proper or rational for a person to accept belief in God without the need for an argument. First, there are very few people who have access to or the ability to assess most theistic arguments. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that the demand for evidence would be a requirement of reason” (ibid.).

“Second, it seems that God has given us an awareness of himself that is not dependent on theistic arguments. It is hard to imagine that God would make rational belief as difficult as those who demand evidence contend” (ibid.).

“John Calvin believed that God has provided us with a sense of the divine. He writes:

‘There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity.’ This we take to be beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he repeatedly sheds fresh drops… Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that this conviction, namely that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. From this we conclude that it is not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one of which each of us is master from his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits no one to forget” (ibid.).

“Calvin contends that people are accountable to God for their unbelief not because they have failed to submit to a convincing theistic proof, but because they have suppressed the truth that God has implanted within their minds” (ibid.).

Comment:

This is the metaphysical/ontological knowledge of God that every creature possesses.

“Third, belief in God is more like belief in a person than belief in a scientific theory. Consider the examples that started this essay. Somehow the scientific approach—doubt first, consider all of the available evidence, and believe later—seems woefully inadequate or inappropriate to personal relations. What seems manifestly reasonable for physicists in their laboratory is desperately deficient in human relations. Human relations demand trust, commitment, and faith. If belief in God is more like belief in other persons than belief in atoms, then the trust that is appropriate to persons will be appropriate to God. We cannot and should not arbitrarily insist that the scientific method is appropriate to every kind of human practice. The fastidious scientist who cannot leave the demand for evidence in her laboratory will find herself cut off from relationships that she could otherwise reasonably maintain—with friends, family, and even God” (pp. 192-193).

WITH OR WITHOUT EVIDENCE

“The primary obstacle to belief in God seems to be more moral than intellectual” (p. 193).

Comment:

I agree with this 100%!

REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE BIBLE

“What is the biblical or theological basis for Reformed epistemology? Not much, I’m afraid, but I believe that Scripture woefully underdetermines most any philosophical position” (p. 196).

“ . . . there is simply not enough unambiguous evidence from Scripture to support evidentialism, presuppositionalism, or Reformed epistemology as the biblical view” (ibid.).

“Never, within Scripture itself, is there an attempt to prove the existence of God; if proving God’s existence were demanded of all believers, one might expect to find at least one of the believers in the Bible discussing theistic arguments. On the other hand, Scripture is rife with attempts to demonstrate that Yahweh is God. . .” (ibid.).

“I cringe when people claim that their apologetic approach is the biblical approach. Anyone can find some support for his or her position in Scripture. So let a thousand apologetical flowers bloom!” (ibid.).

Comment:

 He does not believe that apologetics should have a theological basis. 

“The reason that Scripture underdetermines any contemporary apologetic approach seems clear. The Bible was written during a time when virtually everyone assumed the existence of some god or another. The Bible does try to make a case that Yahweh is God, and the New Testament tries to make a case that he has revealed himself uniquely in the Christ (in both instances, the biblical writers refer to the kinds of beliefs that people in their culture might find appealing). But everywhere the existence of a god is assumed. That we should directly import that approach into our contemporary context seems ill-advised. In our culture, a great many people do not believe in the existence of a god. How those people might be best approached, therefore, will require a great deal of human ingenuity and not merely reflection on how it was done in biblical times. Since so much has been left to human ingenuity and since Scripture both underdetermines one’s apologetic and was written to and for another culture, there will be many Christian apologetics and not merely one. What Christian virtue requires in dealing with one another’s views is charity, intellectual respect, fairness, and humility” (pp. 196-197).

Comment:

Human ingenuity.

Reading between the lines, presuppositional apologetics by claiming to be the biblical apologetics seem to violate the required Christian virtue.

POSTMODERNISM

“I shall, skipping lightly over the history of modern philosophy, define postmodernism against the backdrop of modern philosophy. The early modern world was in intellectual turmoil awaiting a rational decision procedure by a Descartes, a Locke, or a Kant. In science, politics, and religion, revolutions were rife and the time ripe for a method of rational discernment” (p. 198).

“Although it is impossible to set a precise modus operandi for modern philosophy, there are some shared concerns among its key players. Foremost among these concerns was the quest for both certainty and rational consensus” (ibid.).

“A second pervasive assumption of the Cartesian project is internalism. . . What makes internalism attractive is that it places the justification of our beliefs within our own intellectual purview” (ibid.).

“I take the Cartesian project as the defining ideal of the modern period; so the postmodern period we are in now should be understood as post-Cartesian. Gone, I believe, are the prospects both for rational certainty and consensus (at least on matters of fundamental human concern). Likewise, I believe that hopes for internalism are illusory” (ibid.).

“Plantinga argues that modern foundationalism has misunderstood the nature of justification. Modern foundationalism is based on an unattainable quest for certainty and is unduly internalist. Plantinga calls the special property that turns true belief into knowledge ‘warrant’” (ibid.).

POSTOMODERN APOLOGETICS

“How might a Reformed epistemologist defend her faith in our postmodern world?” (p. 200).

“According to the theory of warrant developed above, a person has a warranted belief in God if her belief in God is produced by her properly functioning cognitive faculties in circumstances to which those faculties are designed to apply. I have mentioned above that it appears that we do have a faculty that produces belief in God in us in appropriate circumstances. This faculty, more often than not, produces belief in God immediately without the support of a theistic argument. This does not mean that belief in God is not grounded in experience or that it cannot be based on such an argument. But if we do have such a cognitive faculty and it produces belief in God in the appropriate circumstances, then belief in God is warranted if it is not based on an argument” (ibid.).

“One good apologetic strategy, therefore, is to encourage unbelievers to put themselves in situations where people are typically taken with belief in God: on a mountain, for example, or at the sea, where we see God’s majesty and creative power” (ibid.).

“A variety of circumstances are appropriate to evoking or awaking belief in God, for example, the birth of one’s child, watching the sunset on the mountains or the ocean, examining the beauty of a flower, noting that we are ‘fearfully and wonderfully made,’ or walking through the woods in a time of quiet reflection” (ibid.).

“We move from circumstances that are full of wonder to circumstances that are full of terror. Death often awakens a dormant sense of the divine” (ibid.).

“Here, in our day and age, the primary issues are the problem of evil, science and religion, and the hermeneutics of suspicion” (ibid.).

“By the latter, I mean the hermeneutical critiques of religious belief offered by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. They peer into the dark underbelly of belief and find ignoble motives. In displaying these motives—the desire for power, the need for a father figure, the fear of death, the justification of one’s socio-economic stature—they seek to undermine religious belief. I believe that the hermeneutics of suspicion provides a much needed corrective to our natural tendency toward spiritual pride, but nonetheless, people still need to be shown that this secular trinity has not proven that God does not exist or that it is irrational to believe in God” (pp. 200-201).

“The apparent threat of science to religion seems to have recently intensified. Richard Dawkins, whose new appointment at Oxford seems to have carried with it the charge to critique religious faith, has stated that Charles Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist. Concerning evolution, Daniel Dennett contends that those who doubt that evolutionary theory explains the origin of species are inexcusably ignorant and suggests that such people should be locked up. There are at least three options for the thinking Christian apologist. One option is to resist evolutionary theory, another is to remain agnostic about the truth of evolutionary theory, and yet another is to embrace it” (p. 201).

“The problem of evil is the most formidable and apparently intractable obstacle to belief in God, and it is easy to see why. It is difficult to imagine that God could exist given the various kinds and amounts of evils that exist in the world today” (ibid.).

“When it comes to explaining evil, Christians are often tempted by the trivial, the trite, and the superficial” (ibid.).

“We shouldn’t underestimate the suffering of the world, and we shouldn’t glibly explain it away” (ibid.).

“I can only suggest that Christian apologists do their homework. A great deal of recent thought has gone into the problem of evil. It is useful, I believe, to venture outside our comfortable sphere of belief—to hear challenges in their full weight and to learn how other theistic traditions address the problem of evil. I have found the Jewish tradition especially insightful on both counts; Jews have faced unspeakable evil, and many have come out with a deeper, more reflective faith. The book of Job teaches us that one thing is certain: We are more likely to go wrong than right in our theodicies. Intellectual humility is called for in the face of horrific evil” (ibid.).

“What people start with determines what people will end up with. What people reason from determines the kinds of inferences that it is rationally permissible for them to accept. There is no belief-neutral, obvious foundation of beliefs to which to appeal in arguing for the existence of God. The starting point for our beliefs is our socio-cultural upbringing. Our beliefs are situated in a specific historical context. Should you embark on the reason-giving project, you need to recognize this and try your best to find some common beliefs to appeal to” (p. 202).

A Presuppositionalist’s Response by John Frame

“I am very grateful to Alvin Plantinga, Kelly James Clark, and others for developing and arguing the thesis that it can be rational to believe in God (and in other things) without argument. I think their case for this thesis is quite cogent, and I agree with it entirely. To prevent confusion, however, I would add a qualification: Warranted belief does not need to be based on argument, but it does need to be based on fact, on reality. I take it this is what the Reformed epistemologists mean when they say that warranted belief without argument is not groundless” (p. 217).

A REDUCED CLAIM

“But to say that unargued theism can be a rational belief is to say very little compared to the traditional claims of apologetics. Consider the different claims apologists over the centuries have made for the epistemic status of their conclusions: necessary truth (Anselm), demonstration (Aquinas, William Craig), high probability (Joseph Butler), the best explanation (Gary Habermas, Paul Feinberg), rational believability (Clark). I list these in roughly descending order of strength. Rational believability is about the weakest claim that could be made for Christian theism. . . But in my view, a robust faith in Christian theism will certainly claim more than that one can be rational in so believing. In my own view, even Anselm’s claim is too weak. Our claim should be that the Christian theistic revelation is the very criterion of truth, the most certain thing we know” (p. 218).

THE BIBLE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

“I was rather disappointed at Clark’s treatment of the role of the Bible in determining apologetic principles. I grant that Scripture ‘underdetermines’ many philosophical questions (p. 275), including some that Clark mentions, and I also grant that the apologetic situation we face today is significantly different from the situation that existed in Bible times. But can any serious reader of Scripture doubt that God’s Word plays a determinative role in the human knowledge of God? That the testimony of the Holy Spirit is essential? That there is an antithesis between godly wisdom and the wisdom of the world?” (p. 220).

“When Clark says that ‘anyone can find some support for his or her position in Scripture’ (p. 275), he sounds much too much like the village atheist who says, ‘You can make the Bible teach anything.’ When I hear people talking like this, whether they be village atheists or philosophical apologists, I am inclined to think that they haven’t tried hard enough to find out what the Bible says” (ibid.).

SOME COMMENDATIONS, WITH QUALIFICATIONS

“Nevertheless, there is much in Clark’s essay that I find refreshing and edifying. When he says that ‘reasoning must start somewhere. There have to be some truths that we can just accept and reason from. Why not start with belief in God?’ (pp. 270-71), I rejoice. This is a mighty first step toward a presuppositional understanding. But if this divine starting point is the sovereign Lord of Scripture, it will not be enough to say that belief in him is independent of argument; rather, we must allow him to establish the very standards that govern argument. I’m not sure that Clark understands all that is involved in accepting God as an epistemic starting point” (p. 221).

“I also like Clark’s emphasis that belief in God, like belief in other persons, demands ‘trust, commitment, and faith’ (p. 272)” (ibid.).

“And I’m thankful for Clark’s emphasis on the multitude of situations that can evoke belief in God, with and without arguments. Indeed, ‘humility, not proofs, seems more appropriate to the realization of belief in God’ (p. 273), particularly, as Clark later adds, in the face of the problem of evil” (ibid.).

“I would insist, however, that the facts of God’s creation (including his Word, his world, and ourselves as his image) do have the power to persuade all. Indeed, Paul tells us that they do persuade all, but that apart from grace people renounce their persuasion, suppressing the knowledge of God that they have (Rom. 1:20-21). The clarity by which God reveals himself leaves unbelievers without excuse” (ibid.).

“And of course this presuppositionalist resonates warmly to Clark when he says:

What people start with determines what they will end up with. What people reason from determines the kinds of inferences that it is rationally permissible for them to accept. There is no belief-neutral, obvious foundation of beliefs to which to appeal in arguing for the existence of God (p. 283)” (ibid.).

“But then he disappoints: ‘The starting point for our beliefs is our socio-cultural upbringing’ (p. 283). Only that? Not our religious convictions? After all, he did say earlier that God is a kind of starting point. Does’nt the Bible say anything about the starting points of both believers and unbelievers, particularly that they stem ultimately, not from culture, but from belief or unbelief in the true God?” (ibid.).

“For Christians, our socio-cultural background is far less important in governing our lives than our covenant with the almighty God, who tells us to do all things to his glory (1 Cor. 10:31). Can all things possibly exclude reasoning?” (ibid.).

“I see Clark making some progress toward the presuppositional kingdom, but he is not quite there yet. Nevertheless, he has much to say of interest, enlightenment, and encouragement to presuppositionalists. That is to be expected since, after all, presuppositionalists too are Reformed epistemologists” (pp. 221-222).