The Diminishing Influence of Apologetics and Van Til’s Vision
The year 1928
was considered a milestone in the history of apologetics for it was in that
year that Cornelius Van Til took the position of Instructor of Apologetics at
the Princeton Theological Seminary. A year after, Princeton was reorganized
cutting off the tradition of the Old Princeton. As a result, under the
leadership of J. Gresham Machen, Van Til left Princeton and helped in the
formation of Westminster. It was in this seminary that Van Til developed the
new approach in Christian apologetics. His goal was to establish apologetics on
Christian foundation.
During this
time, apologetics was taken for granted as a result of the offensive attacks
coming from both humanism and liberal theology. Apologetics was perceived
as an “attempt to defend an outworn theological position” with “outdated”
method. Moreover, apologetics within the Dutch Reformed tradition had been
abandoned due to Abraham Kuyper’s influence. Kuyper does not like the defensive character
of apologetics. He based this conclusion on the history of this academic
discipline, which is characterized with weakness and passivity. In the mind of
Cornelius Van Til, such weakness is not due to the inherent nature of apologetics
itself, but because Christian apologists allows its critics to occupy a
neutral ground. To address this
problem, Van Til’s ambition was “to reinstate apologetics” “on a new basis”.
From
Empiricism to Idealism
Prior to the
realization of Van Til’s goal, modern apologetics was based on empirical
foundation “prepared by modern scientific discovery”. Van Til saw this as
problematic for under this framework, proving Christianity is considered
impossible and irrational. However, though unreasonable, Christianity is still
accepted provided that it will confine itself on practical matters.
Examples of Christian
apologists employing this empirical basis are identified. We have here first Bishop
Butler with his “argument for life after death”. This argument is based “on the
faith in the regularity of nature which had been cultivated by the success of
the classical physics. Based on this idea of regularity of nature from
classical physics, both reason and experience inform us that “the discontinuity
experienced in death” does not break “the continuity we have observed in life”
(p. 277). Death is part of this idea of regularity of nature and thereby it is assumed reasonable “that it
will not totally obliterate personal identity” (ibid.). Based on this chain of
reasoning, it is considered acceptable to believe on the probability of the
existence of life after death.
Another
apologist was William Paley with his argument from design. He argues that human
reason and experience attest to the fact “that things evidencing design are the
work of a designer, then by analogy we can argue that the universe, which also
shows the marks of design, is the work of a great designer, ...” (ibid.).
The most
devastating critic of classical apologetics came from David Hume. For him, Butler’s
argument was invalid for “it had sought to appeal to experience to establish
the probability of things that lay beyond the scope of experience” (p. 278). For Hume, the regularity of nature cannot be
used to prove the relationship “between what was within experience” and “what
was beyond experience”. The only alternative is found “by means of the
cause-effect relationship” but it had its “meaning only within the bounds of
experience itself” (ibid.). The basis of Hume’s rational argument is taken from
“a functional, psychological basis of understanding” (ibid.). From this basis,
“He sought to understand the unity of the world and of the self in terms of the
tendency of the mind to think in terms of a continuum, filling in the gaps
where necessary” (ibid.). “Butler appealed to classical physics with its idea
of inertia,” whereas Hume appealed “to the inner life” (ibid.). From this concept, the following
interpretation related to unity and miracles is accepted: “The ideas of the
unity of the world and the self, and also the notions of miracle and the
supernatural, are ascribable to the tendency of the mind to proceed beyond what
is available to experience. Miracle stories are understandable as the
fabrication of the untutored, primitive mind, to which the stories of the
miraculous and the wonderful are agreeable” (ibid.).
After stating
Hume’s empirical stance, Dr. Knudsen acknowledged that Reformed apologists
recognize that Hume’s criticism of traditional apologetics as found in Butler
(and William Paley) has an element of truth. However, Hume also adopted similar
stance found among modern thinkers. Basically, Hume’s concept is deistic for he
shares the idea that reason and nature are independent from God. Reason is then
employed to explain God instead of finding in God the foundation and meaning of
reason. The history of deism proves this reversal of position where
“independent reason first became the arbiter and later even the substitute for
God and for his revelation” (p. 279). Evangelicals share this destic concept of
reason’s independence though it retains its concept of revelation. In affirming
reason’s independence, faith is viewed as supplemental. The outcome of this
trend in human thinking was a disengagement of “a large segment of human life”
“from direct contact with the self-revealing God” (ibid.). The dominant idea
then is that this world is an impersonal one and it makes evangelicals
“vulnerable to the attacks of more radical deists,” who discard faith and only
rely upon reason. Evangelicals are defenseless against the ideas of Hume for
“the latter simply carried the empirical position, placed in the setting of a
neutral reason, to its consistent expression” ibid.).
Based on the
foregoing observation, Hume’s method undermined both “the traditional arguments
for Christianity” and “the foundation of the unity of the world and the self”
(p. 280). Because of this the idealists, looked for another approach and they
found it in transcendental concept coming from the school of idealism.
James Orr
championed this new approach. Dr. Knudsen states that Orr’s approach was a
product of the modification made by Thomas Hill Green of the idealism taught by
both Kant and Hegel. I suspect that at this point, Dr. Knudsen is trying to
connect the idealist concept of transcendental approach to the transcendental
presuppositional apologetics developed by Van Til. If Dr. Knudsen is correct in
his analysis, we could say that Van Til is Kantian-Hegelian or dialectic in his
apologetics. We cannot avoid such conclusion for we can find similarity of
expressions between Van Til’s apologetics and the way Dr. Knudsen describes
James Orr’s transcendental approach. Here are few examples: “The mind was to be
guided back to its own most ultimate presuppositions” (ibid.). The
transcendental approach is considered “concrete, in the sense that from the
outset all the factors involved were to be taken into consideration” (ibid.). The
set of presuppositions used in transcendental approach is taken from
Christianity. Without transcendental “pressupositions experience would
degenerate into chaos” (ibid.). “The only foundation for the order and
uniformity of nature is not something derived from our experience itself but is
the absolute system within the mind of God” (ibid.). And then Dr. Knudsen in
establishing the connection between idealism and Van Til’s apologetics, made
this conclusion: “Presuppotional apologetics has capitalized upon elements of
the method which emerged from the transcendental idealistic movement as were
used by James Orr” (p. 281). Furthermore, Dr. Knudsen describes James Orr’s
position as “idealistic” and “rationalistic,” charges that can also be ascribed
to Van Til’s position. Moreover, in the mind of Dr. Knudsen, “Orr’s idealistic
faith in the power of of the idea of human reason leads him to views that are
reminiscent of deism” (ibid.).
The
Birth of Presuppositional Apologetics
For Dr.
Knudsen, the unique elements in Orr’s transcendental approach was picked up by
Van Til. These elements include “the importance of presuppositions and of one’s
starting point” (p. 282). Van Til’s starting point includes the following
theological elements: doctrine of creation, which distinguishes between Creator
and creatures, clarity and accessibility of revelation making man inexcusable,
doctrine of the fall making sinners incapable to rightly interpret God’s
revelation, and doctrine of redemption teaching us that Christ is God’s
ultimate revelation and the only way to restore man the ability to correctly
interpret divine revelation.
Dr. Knudsen
describes Van Til’s apologetical stance as follows: “Progressive,” which is
solidly based on historic Christianity; built upon the foundation laid down by
Abraham Kuyper; that “only on the foundation of Christian presuppositions that
meaningful discourse is possible” (p. 283); that a Christian apologist must
“stand within the Christian theistic position itself” as an act of recognizing
the Creator-creature distinction in his reasoning. Elsewhere, Dr. Knudsen added
descriptions such as “indirect” and “existential” (p. 291).
Based on the
above narration, we cannot avoid to think that in Dr. Knudsen’s mind,
presuppositionalist is a sub-category under idealism. With Cornelius Van Til,
other presuppositionalist apologists
include Gordon H. Clark, Edward John Carnell, and Francis Schaeffer.
Gordon H. Clark
is a presuppositionalist in the sense that his apologetical stance “depends
upon the choice of a set of axioms” taken from Christian faith (pp. 284-285).
He is described as a “rationalist” who thinks that “Truth can be expressed only
in propositions” (ibid.). Another presuppositionalist, Edward John Carnell was
a disciple of Gordon Clark in the early apologetical stance of the latter. They
part ways later due to the change both in Clark’s and Carnell’s stance. Dr.
Ronald Nash is familiar with this change in Clark’s position, rejects it and
follows Carnell’s position instead. For Clark, the origin of his axioms is
found “in the intellect of the sovereign God” (p. 285) known only by way of
divine revelation. Dr. Knudsen describes tis position as “metaphysical theism”
(p. 286).
As already
mentioned, Edward John Carnell learned much from Clark and therefore was also a
“presuppositional and rationalistic” (ibid).
He differed from Clark in terms of not emphasizing too much on the
metaphysical nature of his chosen fundamental axioms, but putting emphasis
rather “on testing these axioms by applying the principle of logical
consistency” (ibid.). Carnell has numerous alternatives regarding the question
of point of contact. They include “the human rational faculty,” “values,”
“judicial sentiment,” and “the unspoiled consciousness of the happy child”
(ibid.). Carnell introduced another point of contact in his later years. This
time it’s “the kingdom of love,” which is purely natural and not evangelical
(p. 288).
Francis Schaeffer
is another popular presuppositionalist. “He has become especially popular for
his critique of culture from a Christian point of view” (p. 289).
Before
returning to Van Til, Dr. Knudsen mentioned John Warwick Montgomery’s attempt
to return to classical apologetics, which is a revival of Bishop Butler’s
methodology.
For Dr.
Knudsen, typical points in Van Til’s criticism of other apologetical stance
emphasize the myth of neutrality and epistemological autonomy. Dr. Knudsen due
to his adherence to cosmonomy, pointed out what he perceived to be “foreign
elements” in Van Til’s thought. He did it by gently narrating them from pages
291 to 294 and concluded with a set of questions from pages 295 to 298.
Van
Til’s Response
Van Til
responded to Dr. Knudsen’s article. He describes the latter’s perceived “foreign
elements” in his thought as “very negative serious consequences” arising from his
concept of divine intellect. He restated and summarized them in page 299. They
include seven problems and because of them, in the mind of Dr. Knudsen, Van Til
was not able “to hold to a sound theology and have no proper basis for a sound
Christian apologetic.” Van Til explained that Dr. Knudsen failed to understand
his apologetical stance. This is evident by interpreting Van Til’s locus of
meaning ‘in the theoretical-logical” and by describing Van Til’s concept of
divine knowledge as “analytical” without any qualification. Van Til
admitted that he described God’s
knowledge as “analytical” but clarified that he is using the term not in the
sense that Dr. Knudsen interprets it by giving a brief survey of his approach. Finally,
Van Til concluded his response by acknowledging his indebtedness to cosmonomy
as presented both by Vollehoven and Dooyeweerd. However, in the course of time,
he started to see “foreign elements” in Dooyeweerd’s concept of cosmonomy,
which caused him to depart from it. These foreign elements have something to do
with Dooyeweerd’s acceptance of a concept of law apart from the doctrine of
creation.
Concluding this
summary, one thing I learn in reading Dr. Knudsen’s article is that when you
disagree with an author, it entails an extra cautious reading on your part for
you to critically assess both the points of disagreement and at the same time,
for you to humbly listen and learn from the insights the author is trying to
communicate.
Guide
Questions:
1.
According to Dr. Knudsen, why
the year 1928 was considered a milestone in the history of apologetics?
2.
What is the goal of Cornelius
Van Til about apologetics?
3.
What are the reasons for the
neglect of the importance of apologetics in the modern times?
4.
What is the primary problem
with modern Christian apologetics?
5.
How is Christianity perceived
as a result of basing Christian apologetics on empirical evidence?
6.
Give examples of Christian
apologists who employ such empirical evidence. Briefly explain their primary
argument.
7.
In what way do evangelicals
share in Hume’s deistic assumptions? In what way deism affects society and the
evangelicals?
8.
How do apologists respond to
empirical criticism?
9.
Is it correct to classify Van
Til’s transcendental presuppositional apologetics as idealist?
10. What theological themes are included in Van Til’s starting point?
11. How did Dr. Knudsen describe Van Til’s apologetical stance?
12. Give examples of Christian presuppositionalist apologists.
13. Enumerate Edward John Carnell’s different points of contact between
believers and non-believers.
14. What are the usual points of
criticism identified by Van Til in other schools of apologetics?
15. What is the primary influence in Dr. Knudsen’s thought that caused
him to see “foreign elements” in Van Til’s apologetical stance?
16. If the problems identified by Dr. Knudsen in Van Til’s apologetical
stance is true, what will be the conclusion?
17. Briefly describe Van Til’s response to Dr. Knudsen’s article.
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Reference: Progressive
and Regressive Tendencies in Christian Apologetics by Robert D. Knudsen (Geehan,
E.R. ed. 1971, Jerusalem and Athens:
Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til,
Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., pp.
275-305).
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