This blog post will serve as an example how does a presuppositional apologist like Greg Bahnsen refuted arguments against Christianity. The material on this topic relies heavily on Greg Bahnsen’s Apologetics in Practice.
Instead of starting with a usual theoretical foundation, we
will introduce the subject of presuppositional apologetics with a concrete
illustration to show how it works in practice.
And so we will start with a reading of Bertrand Russell’s
essay, “Why I Am Not a Christian?” After reading the essay, we will present Bahnsen’s article in
outline format covering a brief narrative of Russell’s philosophical evolution,
criticisms against Christianity, and a refutation of them.
A.
Brief
history of Bertrand Russell’s philosophical evolution
1. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) studied
mathematics and philosophy at Cambridge University and began his teaching
career there.
2. He wrote respected works as a
philosopher (about Leibniz, about the philosophy of Mathematics and set theory,
about the metaphysics of mind and matter, about epistemological problems).
3. He was influential on
twentieth-century developments in the philosophy of language.
4. He also wrote extensively in a more
popular vein on literature, education and politics.
5. Controversy surrounded him. He was
dismissed by Trinity College for pacifist activities in 1916; he was jailed in
1961 in connection with a campaign for nuclear disarmament. His views on sexual
morality contributed to the annulment of his appointment to teach at the City
University of New York in 1940.
6. In 1944 he returned to teach at
Cambridge, and in 1950 he became a recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature.
7. For all his stature as a philosopher,
Russell cannot be said to have been sure of himself and consistent in his views
regarding reality or knowledge. In his early years he adopted the Hegelian
idealism taught by F. H. Bradley. Influenced by G. E. Moore, he changed to a
Platonic theory of ideas. Challenged by Ludwig Wittgenstein that mathematics
consists merely of tautologies, he turned to metaphysical and linguistic
atomism. He adopted the extreme realism of Alexius Meinong, only later to turn toward
logical constructionism instead. Then following the lead of William James,
Russell abandoned mind-matter dualism for the theory of neutral monism.
Eventually Russell propounded materialism with fervor, even though his
dissatisfaction with his earlier logical atomism left him without an
alternative metaphysical account of the object of our empirical experiences.
Struggling with philosophical problems not unlike those which stymied David
Hume, Russell conceded in his later years that the quest for certainty is a
failure.
B.
Criticisms
against Christianity
1. The essay "Why I Am Not a
Christian" is the text of a lecture which Russell delivered to the
National Secular Society in London on March 6, 1927.
2. In that essay, Russell argued that he
could not be a Christian because:
a. the Roman Catholic church is mistaken
to say that the existence of God can be proved by unaided reason;
b. serious defects in the character and
teaching of Jesus show that he was not the best and wisest of men, but actually
morally inferior to Buddha and Socrates;
c. people accept religion on emotional
grounds, particularly on the foundation of fear, which is "not worthy of
self-respecting human beings"; and
d. the Christian religion "has been
and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world."
3. Russell’s own statements:
a. "I am as firmly convinced that
religions do harm as I am that they are untrue."
b. He repeatedly charges in one way or
another that a free man who exercises his reasoning ability cannot submit to
religious dogma.
c. He argued that religion was a hindrance to the advance of civilization, that it cannot cure our troubles, and that we do not survive death.
C.
Refutation
1. In criticizing Christians for their
views of ultimate reality, of how we know what we know, and of how we should
live our lives, did Bertrand Russell have a defensible alternative from which
to launch his attacks?
2. He could not give an account of
reality and knowing which -- on the grounds of, and according to the criteria
of, his own autonomous reasoning – was cogent, reasonable and sure.
3. Guilty of inconsistency. He could not say with certainty what was true about reality
and knowledge, but nevertheless he was firmly convinced that Christianity was
false!
4. He asserts that our ideals and values
are not objective and supported by the nature of reality, indeed that they are
fleeting and doomed to destruction. On the other hand, quite contrary to this,
Russell encourages us to assert our autonomous values in the face of a
valueless universe -- to act as though they really amounted to something
worthwhile, were rational, and not merely the result of chance. What sense
could Russell hope to make of an immaterial value (an ideal) in the face of an
"omnipotent matter" which is blind to values?
5. Inconsistent, for in his worldview, an absolute moral standard does not
exist. The second
reason offered above presupposes some absolute standard of moral wisdom by
which somebody could grade Jesus as either inferior or superior to others.
Likewise, the third reason presupposes a fixed criterion for what is, and what
is not, "worthy" of self-respecting human beings.
6. Due to the absence of absolute moral standard, how did he come up with an
idea of moral progress?
7. Then again, the complaint expressed
in the fourth reason would not make any sense unless it is objectively wrong to
be an enemy of "moral progress"; indeed, the very notion of moral
"progress" itself assumes an established benchmark for morality by
which to assess progress.
8. Borrowing “capital” from the worldview he hates. Now, if Russell had been reasoning
and speaking in terms of the Christian worldview, his attempt to assess moral
wisdom, human worthiness, and moral progress -- as well as to adversely judge
shortcomings in these matters - would be understandable and expected.
Christians have a universal, objective and absolute standard of morality in the
revealed word of God. But obviously Russell did not mean to be speaking as
though he adopted Christian premises and perspectives! On what basis, then,
could Russell issue his moral evaluations and judgments? In terms of what view
of reality and knowledge did he assume that there was anything like an
objective criterion of morality by which to find Christ, Christians, and the
church lacking?
9. Un-argued philosophical bias. Russell just took it for granted, as an unargued
philosophical bias, that there was a moral standard to apply, and that he could
presume to be the spokesman and judge who applies it. One could easily counter
Russell by simply saying that he had arbitrarily chosen the wrong standard of
morality. To be fair, Russell's opponents must be granted just as much
arbitrariness in choosing a moral standard, and they may then select one
different from his own.
10. Guilty of behavior contrary to his professed beliefs. By assuming the prerogative to pass
moral judgment, Russell evidenced that his own presuppositions fail to comport
with each other. In offering a condemning value-judgment against Christianity,
Russell engaged in behavior which betrayed his professed beliefs elsewhere. In
his lecture, Russell professed that this was a chance world which shows no
evidence of design, and where "laws" are nothing more than
statistical averages describing what has happened. He professed that the
physical world may have always existed, and that human life and intelligence
came about in the way explained by Darwin (evolutionary natural selection). Our
values and hopes are what "our intelligence can create." This is
simply to say that human values are subjective, fleeting, and self-created. In
short, they are relative. Holding to this kind of view of moral values, Russell
was utterly inconsistent in acting as though he could assume an altogether
different kind of view of values, declaring an absolute moral evaluation of
Christ or Christians.
11. Inconsistent and irrational. “One aspect of Russell's network of beliefs rendered another
aspect of his set of beliefs unintelligible.” Take for instance the
"laws" of science. “On the one hand, such laws are merely
descriptions of what has happened in the past, says Russell. On the other hand,
Russell spoke of the laws of science as providing a basis for projecting what
will happen in the future, namely the decay of the solar system. This kind of
dialectical dance between conflicting views of scientific law (to speak
epistemologically) or between conflicting views of the nature of the physical
cosmos (to speak metaphysically) is characteristic of unbelieving thought. Such
thinking is not in harmony with itself and is thus irrational.”
12. Arbitrary and capricious. In the first reason given by Russell for why he was not a
Christian, he alluded to the dogma of the Roman Catholic Church that "the
existence of God can be proved by the unaided reason."[1]
13. He then turns to some of the more
popular arguments advanced for the existence of God which are (supposedly)
based upon this "unaided reason" and
easily finds them wanting. It goes without saying, of course, that
Russell thought that he was defeating these arguments of unaided reason by
means of his own (superior) unaided reason. Russell did not disagree with Rome
that man can prove things with his "natural reason" (apart from the
supernatural work of grace). Indeed at the end of his lecture he called his
hearers to "a fearless outlook and a free intelligence." Russell
simply disagreed that unaided reason takes one to God. In different ways, and
with different final conclusions, both the Roman church and Russell encouraged
men to exercise their reasoning ability autonomously -- apart from the foundation
and restraints of divine revelation.
14. Another example of dialectical dance, inconsistency and irrationality:
trying to reconcile two opposing principles, random/chance and uniformity. The nagging problem which Russell
simply did not face is that, on the basis of autonomous reasoning, man cannot
give an adequate and rational account of the knowledge we gain through science
and logic. Scientific procedure assumes that the natural world operates in a
uniform fashion, in which case our observational knowledge of past cases
provides a basis for predicting what will happen in future cases. However,
autonomous reason has no basis whatsoever for believing that the natural world
will operate in a uniform fashion. Russell himself (at times) asserted that
this is a chance universe. He could never reconcile this view of nature being
random with his view that nature is uniform (so that "science" can
teach us).
15. Same criticism applies to knowledge and laws of logic in Russell’s
worldview. So it is
with a knowledge and use of the laws of logic (in terms of which Russell
definitely insisted that fallacies be avoided). The laws of logic are not
physical objects in the natural world; they are not observed by man's senses.
Russell's autonomous reasoning could not explain or justify these
characteristics of logical laws. An individual's unaided reason is limited in
the scope of its use and experiences, in which case it cannot pronounce on what
is universally true (descriptively). On the other hand, an individual's unaided
reason is in no position to dictate (prescriptively) universal laws of thought
or to assure us that these stipulations for the mind will somehow prove
applicable to the world of thought or matter outside the individual's mind.
16. Russell's worldview could not provide a foundation for the
intelligibility of science or logic. His "unaided" reason could not
account for the knowledge which men readily gain in God's universe, a universe sovereignly controlled
(so that it is uniform) and interpreted in light of the Creator's revealed mind
(so that there are immaterial laws of thought which are universal).
17. We must note, finally, that Russell's
case against being a Christian is subject to criticism for its reliance upon prejudicial conjecture and
logical fallacies. That being the case, he cannot be thought to have
established his conclusions or given good reason for his rejection of
Christianity. One stands in amazement, for instance, that the same Russell who
could lavish ridicule upon past Christians for their ignorance and lack of
scholarship, could come out and say something as uneducated and inaccurate as
this: "Historically it is quite doubtful whether Christ ever existed at
all, and if He did we do not know anything about Him." Even forgetting
secular references to Christ in the ancient world, Russell's remark simply
ignores the documents of the New Testament as early and authentic witnesses to
the historical person of Jesus. Given the relatively early dates of these
documents and the relatively large number of them, if Russell
"doubted" the existence of Jesus Christ, he must have either applied
a conspicuous double standard in his historical reasoning, or been an agnostic
about virtually the whole of ancient history. Either way, we are given an
insight into the prejudicial nature of Russell's thinking when it came to
consideration of the Christian religion.
18. Perhaps the most obvious logical fallacy evident in Russell's lecture comes out
in the way he readily shifts from an evaluation of Christian beliefs to a
criticism of Christian believers. At the very beginning of his lecture,
Russell said, "I do not mean by a Christian any person who tries to live
decently and according to his lights. I think that you must have a certain
amount of definite belief before you have a right to call yourself a
Christian." That is, the object of Russell's criticism should be, by his
own testimony, not the lifestyle of individuals but the doctrinal claims which
are essential to Christianity as a system of thought. The opening of his lecture
focuses upon his dissatisfaction with those beliefs (God's existence,
immortality, Christ as the best of men). Nevertheless, toward the end of his
lecture, Russell's discussion turns in the direction of fallaciously arguing
against the personal defects of Christians (enforcing narrow rules contrary to
human happiness) and the supposed psychological genesis of their beliefs (in
emotion and fear). That is, he indulges in the fallacy of arguing ad hominem.
Even if what Russell had to say in these matters was fair-minded and accurate,
the fact would remain that Russell has descended to the level of arguing
against a truth-claim on the basis of his personal dislike.
19. Notice briefly other defects in
Russell's line of thinking here. He
presumed to know the motivation of a person in becoming a Christian -- even
though Russell's epistemology gave him no warrant for thinking he could discern
such things (especially easily and at a distance). Moreover, he presumed to
know the motivation of a whole class of people (including those who lived long
ago), based on a very, very small sampling from his own present experience.
These are little more than hasty and
unfounded generalizations, telling us (if anything) only about the state of
Russell's mind and feelings in his obvious, emotional antipathy to Christians.
20. But then this leaves us face to face
with a final, devastating fallacy in Russell's case against Christianity -- the use of double standards in his
reasoning.
a. Example 1: Russell wished to fault
Christians for the emotional factor in their faith-commitment, and yet Russell
himself evidenced a similarly emotional factor in his own personal
anti-Christian commitment. Indeed, Russell openly appealed to emotional
feelings of courage, pride, freedom and self-worth as a basis for his audience
to refrain from being Christians!
b. Example 2: Similarly, Russell tried
to take Christians to task for their "wickedness" (as though there
could be any such thing within Russell's worldview) -- for their cruelty, wars,
inquisitions, etc. Russell did not pause for even a moment, however, to reflect
on the far-surpassing cruelty and violence of non-Christians throughout
history. Genghis Khan, Vlad the Impaler, Marquis de Sade and a whole cast of
other butchers were not known in history for their Christian professions.
21. Conclusion: Russell's essay "Why I Am Not a Christian" reveals to us that even the intellectually elite of this world are refuted by their own errors in opposing the truth of the Christian faith. There is no credibility to a challenge to Christianity which evidences prejudicial conjecture, logical fallacies, unargued philosophical bias, behavior which betrays professed beliefs, and presuppositions which do not comport with each other. Why wasn't Russell a Christian? Given his weak effort at criticism, one would have to conclude that it was not for intellectual reasons.
22. Summary of refutation:
a. Guilty of inconsistency
b. Inconsistent, for in his worldview,
an absolute moral standard does not exist.
c. Due to the absence of absolute moral
standard, how did he come up with an idea of moral progress?
d. Borrowing “capital” from the
worldview he hates.
e. Guilty of un-argued philosophical
bias
f.
Guilty
of behavior contrary to his professed beliefs
g. Irrational
h. Arbitrary and capricious
i.
Another
example of dialectical dance, inconsistency and irrationality: trying to
reconcile two opposing principles, random/chance and uniformity
j.
Same
criticism applies to knowledge and laws of logic in Russell’s worldview.
k. Russell's worldview could not provide
a foundation for the intelligibility of science or logic. His
"unaided" reason could not account for the knowledge which men
readily gain in God's universe
l.
Reliance
upon prejudicial conjecture and logical fallacies
m. The most obvious logical fallacy
evident in Russell's lecture comes out in the way he readily shifts from an
evaluation of Christian beliefs to a criticism of Christian believers.
n. He presumed to know the motivation of
a person in becoming a Christian -- even though Russell's epistemology gave him
no warrant for thinking he could discern such things
o. Hasty and unfounded generalizations
p. The use of double standards
[1]
In his lecture Russell displays a curious and capricious shifting around for
the standard which defines the content of "Christian"
beliefs. Here he arbitrarily assumes that what the Roman magisterium says is
the standard of Christian faith. Yet in the paragraph immediately preceding, Russell claimed that
the doctrine of hell was not essential to Christian belief because the
Privy Council of the English Parliament had so decreed (over the dissent of
the Archbishops of
Canterbury and York). Elsewhere Russell departs from this criterion of
Christianity and excoriates the teaching of Jesus, based upon the Bible, that the unrepentant face
everlasting damnation. Russell had no interest in being consistent or fair in
dealing with Christianity as his opponent. When convenient he defined the faith
according to the Bible,
but when it was more convenient for his polemical purposes he shifted to
defining the faith according to the English Parliament or the Roman Catholic Church.
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