Giving the complete and more precise title to this article would surely make a reader tired and disinterested. And that is why at the risk of appearing simplistic, I reduced the title to just six words from the original of twenty-three. This is the article’s complete title: An Alternative Methodological Framework of Ethics as Apologetics through Interdisciplinary Approaches in Asia: Contemporary Protestant Christianity versus New Confucianism/Ruism as an Example.
Tsung-I Hwang, in his search for an apologetical alternative, relied on more than ten academic disciplines for insights. They include “Christian theology, Confucianism/Ruism, Sinology, religious studies, philosophy, sociology, psychology, social psychology, anthropology, and some other social scientific studies.” He introduced this alternative with a framework containing four elements: ethical issue, common ground towards indirect apologetics, presuppositional method, and common solution.
In introducing his alternative, Hwang finds fault in the classical way of doing apologetics, which he identified as the “evidentialist” school. For him, this school due to western influence and modernity is answering a question that is either taken for granted or rarely asked in the Asian context. Starting from the facts of God’s existence, in his mind, he either undermines or closes the potential dialogue with atheists, non-Christian theists, and postmodernists. That’s the reason for the alternative for he thinks that ethics is something that all worldviews share and therefore provides a strategic starting point. He finds in ethics his common ground. In this case, this common ground is found in the ethical issue called a “repressed form of self.”
Hwang claims that certain “Ruist cultural features” such as “relational selfhood, Ru-influenced hierarchical structure, familism (Ru-based collectivism), the absence of God, and emphasis on moral self-cultivation” lead to this “repressed form of self,” which also contributed “to personality disorders or other psychological and social problems.” Explaining the importance of this ethical issue in his framework, Hwang claims that his alternative approach is motivated not by winning an argument but by concern about the particular ethical issue. Since ethical issues like this are practical, this something that the participants in the dialogue could share. Quoting Moltmann, Hwang describes this kind of apologetical approach as “indirect” for the focus is not on ideas or each other but on finding a solution to the ethical issue that has international significance and to “something outside ourselves.”
Explaining the second element in his framework, Hwang finds five similarities between Moltmann and Weiming. These are “general concerns about the repressed form of self,” “the pursuit of a synthesis of collectivism and individualism,” “the indespensability of relationship with others,” “the ideal community for overcoming the repressed form of self,” and “the being and becoming of self.”
Turning to the third element, in utilizing presuppositional analysis, which he acknowledged as derived from the ideas of Kuyper and Van Til, his goal is to find the differences in presuppositions behind similarities and differences in the starting point. For him, the presuppositional approach is “the best way to deepen the dialogue or debate.” He finds the “indirect apologetical method, the interdisciplinary approach, and the indirect form of dialogue” “fit in well” in his alternative apologetics.
Using “relational selfhood,” an idea that both Tu Weiming-New Ruist and Jurgen Moltmann-contemporary Protestantism share, Hwang identified a difference in their metaphysical presupposition. Tu Weiming’s relational selfhood is based on the “atehistic conception of Chinese cosmology” whereas Jurgen Moltmann’s is taken from Christian Theism. Hwang identified that Tu-Weiming’s apologetical stance has four presuppositions, circular, no single ultimate presupposition, and therefore untenable. In the case of Moltmann, Hwang describes the former’s apologetical stance as having four presuppositions too, not circular, has a single ultimate presupposition, and therefore tenable. Unfortunately, Hwang due to the limitation of his paper failed to discuss in detail the differences between Tu’s and Moltmann’s presuppositions.
As for the last element in this apologetical framework, Hwang claims that his alternative is not limited to just one solution. Instead, all possible solutions are presented with corresponding sterngths and weaknesses. To my mind, the solution that Hwang proposes is connected to an ongoing dialogue. That’s why he anticipates continuous dialogue wherein both parties involved will take the position of each other and will assume the correctness of the opponent’s position for argument sake. After understanding both positions, entrusting the power of the Holy Spirit, the apologists will decide for themselves which solution is better.
Guide Questions:
1. What’s your assessment of Hwang’s project?
2. Does the evidentialist approach close or undermine dialogue?
3. Is the theism of Asia similar to biblical Theism?
4. Is Hwang’s common ground biblical?
5. How do you see the implications of both reliance on the power of the Holy Spirit and the doctrine of total depravity related to Hwang’s common solution?
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